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Abstract
A fascinating real-world example of microeconomic theory can be used to analyze the above "Cleaver" family.
The thought process behind a certain decision made by Robert and Susan represent game theory and
dominant strategies. In a scandal that shook suburbia, Robert and Susan Davis each had extramarital affairs
that could have led to the devastating end of a picture-perfect marriage. Decisions made by each are analyzed
and predicted below using the game theory model. The adulterers each planned strategies regarding their
secret love-affairs to bring about the "best" outcome for themselves. Although Robert and Susan may not have
realized why they made the decisions they did, game theory can help explain how each arrived at his/her final
decision.
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The Story of Robert and Susan Davis 
(And Why They're so Damn Honest!) 
by Paul D. Halley 
Imagine that Robert and Susan Davis, ages 38 and 42, have 
been married for twenty years. The two dated in college, married 
after Susan's graduation and now have two kids, a six-figure 
income and live in Chicago's northwest suburbs. All is well for 
the Davises until the truth comes out about Robert, Susan, Pierre 
and Amanda. 
A fascinating real-world example of microeconomic theory can 
be used to analyze the above "Cleaver" family. The thought 
process behind a certain decision made by Robert and Susan 
represent game theory and dominant strategies. In a scandal that 
shook suburbia, Robert and Susan Davis each had extramarital 
affairs that could have led to the devastating end of a 
picture-perfect marriage. Decisions made by each are analyzed and 
predicted below using the game theory model. The adulterers each 
planned strategies regarding their secret love-affairs to bring 
about the "best" outcome for themselves. Although Robert and 
Susan may not have realized why they made the decisions they did, 
game theory can help explain how each arrived at his/her final 
decision. To start, it is necessary to understand the backgrounds 
and values of the Davises. 
For several months, Robert has felt that he was neglected 
by his wife. Although he harbors no feelings of resentment toward 
her, Robert has accompanied Amanda, his assistant, to many 
"No-tell" motels. Riddled with guilt, Robert is contemplating 
telling his wife of his affair. Although fearing his wife's 
reaction, Robert has much to gain by clearing his conscience. He 
does not wish to jeopardize their relationship. But, if Robert 
doesn't tell his wife, he must live with the guilt of his 
actions, thus leaving his relationship with his wife to suffer 
from his inability to communicate. 
Susan has also fallen prey to the same desires as Robert, 
attaching herself to Pierre, a French chef. She too loves her 
spouse, and wants to keep her marriage alive. For ease in 
story-telling, assume Susan faces the same agonizing decision 
Robert does, and remember, neither Robert nor Susan knows of the 
other's secret. 
Before analyzing the decisions made by Robert and Susan, it 
is extremely important that we recognize the Davis' values. They 
form the basis for assumptions needed to analyze their decisions 
and the fact that neither of the two know of the other's affair. 
Again, assume that Robert and Susan have identical values and 
place great importance upon honesty and communication. Although 
realizing the possibility of separation, each is contemplating 
telling the other of their affair, for more than anything else, 
each wants to clear his/her conscience and be honest to the 
other. 
It is unrealistic to expect "happiness" in a marriage to be 
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measurable, but to analyze the decisions made by Robert and Susan 
requires some sort of happiness scale. Arbitrarily, I have 
chosen a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being least happy and 10 being 
most happy. As you can see, if both decide to tell their other 
unsuspecting half, each will receive a happiness benefit of 9. 
Each benefits from the receiving of the other's honesty, the 
speaking of their own truth and the increased communication 
between the two. Each receives high benefits as the two can now 
happily begin the rest of their lives together. If each remains 
silent, the marriage will somehow reflect the lack of 
communication between the two and the pressure each feels to 
speak their guilty conscience, therefore, each receives a low 
benefit of 3. 
Other cells reflect those benefits received when one spouse 
tells the other without reciprocation. The proclaimed adulterer 
is left feeling ashamed and solely responsible for the disruption 
between the two. If Robert tells Susan about Amanda (or Susan 
about Pierre), Susan will be angered, resulting in a lower 
rating, but she also benefits from Robert's telling of the truth 
and her own lessening of her guilty conscience, as Robert's 
unfaithfulness has somewhat abdicated her actions. By not 
reciprocating Robert's truth, Susan leaves Robert feeling like a 
home-wrecker with an extremely low rating, yet she is somewhat 
sympathetic towards Robert (as she slept around also), not 
totally abolishing Robert for his actions. Therefore Amanda 
receives benefits of 6, because she can now somewhat justify her 
actions, letting her conscience "breathe a little easier", yet 
not as much as if she confessed to Robert, resulting in a 9. 
Robert then receives a happiness rating of 4. He receives higher 
benefits than the 3 for not confessing, because he does clear his 
conscience by being honest, yet he does not receive as much as if 
the two both confessed and received 9's because he believes that 
he is the only adulterer of the two. Susan, who we still assume 
to have the same values and behave in the same way as Robert, 
receives the same benefits as Robert did above and vice versa if 
she tells of her affair with Pierre. 
Therefore, both Robert and Susan have dominant strategies 
because each can optimize benefits by telling the other, 
regardless of what the other does. Analyzing Robert's decision, 
if Susan confesses, Robert receives a 9 for confessing or an 8 
for not confessing. If Susan doesn't confess, he receives 5 for 
confessing or 3 for not confessing. Therefore, Robert should 
confess under any circumstances, assuming he is a happiness 
maximizer by choosing options with higher benefits than 
alternative options. The same process determines Susan's dominant 
strategy, as she receives benefits of 9 for confessing or 8 for 
not confessing if Robert tells the truth, and 5 for confessing or 
3 for not confessing if Robert remains silent. Therefore Susan 
should also confess no matter what Robert does, provided she also 
maximizes her happiness benefits. 
This game theory model cannot be considered a prisoners' 
dilemma, for Robert and Susan, acting in their own self-interests 
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by telling the other or his/her extramarital affair, do not 
expect to gain more benefits than the other by telling the truth. 
There is no contest between the two to feel happier than the 
other, as both are assumed to value their egalitarian marriage. 
Therefore, the only incentive to tell the other is in clearing 
one's own conscience and being honest with the other. The Davis7 
marriage is a partnership and neither wants to inflict pain or 
lower happiness benefits upon the other. If each feels that being 
honest is more important than keeping silent, which each does, 
the results of confessing will be greater than if each kept their 
feelings and pasts bottled up without telling a soul. 
The dominant strategy equilibrium, which is also a Nash 
equilibrium, is for both Robert and Susan to tell each other the 
truth and clear their consciences. The confess-confess strategy 
is a Nash equilibrium because Rob should confess whether Susan 
confesses or doesn't confess, and similarly, Susan should confess 
whether Robert confesses or doesn't confess. Therefore, the 
strategy in the upper-left cell represents a Nash equilibrium and 
the outcome I would expect to occur. 
diagram 
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